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I. INTRODUCTION

Christy is a seventeen-year-old pregnant girl.1 She is a junior in high
school and in the top of her class. Christy plans on going to college and law
school and eventually becoming a lawyer. Christy has never been as stressed
as she is now. She has her SATs coming up in one month, a math test on
Friday, and must make the toughest decision of her life-whether she should
get an abortion.

Jesse Alan Lieberman was born and raised in New York City. At the age of
*
twenty-one, he graduated from the State University of New York at Binghamton, where he
had majored in Mathematics. Mr. Lieberman attended Nova Southeasetern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center in Florida and graduated cum laude in May 2001. While in law
school, Mr. Lieberman won the Best Brief Award in the Freshman Moot Court competition. In
the author's remaining two years at Nova, he served on both Law Review and Moot Court and
was a teaching assistant of Torts. Currently at age twenty-four, Mr. Lieberman is a plaintiff's
personal injury lawyer. He is engaged to Miss Andrea Heslekrants and resides in downtown
Fort Lauderdale.
Jesse Alan Lieberman gives special thanks to his fiancde Andrea for her support
and inspiration in writing this article. He would also like to thank his parents Evelyn and
Eugene Lieberman and his dear friend Rachele Sannino for their encouragement and support.
1.
This story is fictional, however, it demonstrates the practical effects of Florida's
Parental Notice of Abortion Act.
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She definitely does not want to have this baby. If she becomes a mother
now, she will not be able to live the life she was planning to live. She will
not be able to go to college because she will have to get a job to support her
child. Christy will not even get to go on her junior trip to Disney World
because she will have to stay home and take care of her child. She simply is
not ready to become a mother!
In order for Christy to obtain an abortion, under Florida law, the
physician performing the abortion must first notify one of Christy's parents. 2
Christy knows her parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion and
will force her to carry the pregnancy to term against her will. She fears they
will do whatever they can to prevent her from having an abortion, including
confining her to the house. She fears the significant medical risks that
carrying a pregnancy to term poses on minors. Such risks include,
"hemorrhage; infection; worsening medical complications, such as a seizure
disorder or hypertension; risks associated with a caesarian section; and
aggravation
of chronic diseases, such as bowel problems, colitis, and
3
anemia.",
Christy has no idea what to do. The longer she delays this decision, the
greater the risks in obtaining an abortion. She is now thirteen weeks
pregnant. Her risk of mortality from an abortion is now nine times as great
as it was five weeks ago. She knows that she must make a decision soon
before it is too late to obtain an abortion. Christy is considering either going
to another state that does not have this notice requirement or obtaining an
illegal abortion in Florida.
Jennifer is Christy's friend and feels that she is in an even greater
predicament. Jennifer is also a seventeen-year-old pregnant girl who has her
SATs in a month, a math test on Friday, and wants to have an abortion.
Jennifer fears that if one of her parents is notified that she is pregnant, her
parents might force her to leave the house and will terminate financial
support. She also fears that her parents will physically and emotionally
abuse her if they find out that she was sexually active.
Tragically, the stories of Christy and Jennifer will be very similar to the
stories of many minor girls in Florida if Florida's Parental Notice of
Abortion Act ("Act") 4 is ultimately found constitutional. The Act provides:

2.
FLA. STAT. § 390.01115(3)(a) (2001).
3.
Appellees' Supplemental Brief at 28, State v. N. Fla. Women's Health &
Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly 419 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001) (No. ID993279, ID99-3282, ID00-1983).
4.
§ 390.01115.
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[a] termination of pregnancy may not be performed or induced
upon a minor unless the physician performing or inducing the termination of pregnancy has given at least 48 hours actual notice to
one parent or to the legal guardian of the pregnant minor of his5 or
her intention to perform or induce the termination of pregnancy.

The Act further provides that notice is not required if: 1) an immediate
abortion is medically necessary; 2) a parent or guardian waives notice; 3) the
minor is "married or has had the disability of nonage removed;" 4) the minor
has a minor child dependent on her; or 5) the minor has had the notice
6
requirement removed through a judicial bypass procedure.1
This Act was supposed to become effective on July 1, 1999. 7 However,
on June 15, 1999, physicians who perform abortions, clinics that provide
abortion services, women's rights organizations, and some minor female
members filed a complaint presenting a facial challenge to the Act, along
with a motion for a temporary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the
Act. 8 The circuit court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary
injunction on July 27, 1999 .9 On May 12, 2000, the circuit court granted a
final judgment granting a permanent injunction and concluded that the
Parental Notice of Abortion Act was unconstitutional. 10 On February 9,
§ 390.01115(3)(a).
5.
6.
§ 390.01115(3)(b)(1)-(5). In order for the notice requirement to be removed
through a judicial bypass procedure, the minor must petition the court through clear evidence
that she is sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, that there is
parental abuse, or that notice is not in her best interest. The court shall hear evidence relating
to the emotional development, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor. If the court
does not make a ruling within forty eight hours after the petition is filed, the petition is granted
and the notice requirement is waived. The minor has a right to appointed counsel,
confidential proceedings, a full transcript of the proceedings, and an expedited appeal if
necessary. § 390.01115(4).
7.

Appellants' Initial Brief at 1, N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc.,

26 Fla. L. Weekly at D419.
8.

N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D420.

Ordinarily only a person or family whose privacy rights are infringed or
threatened has standing to assert the rights. But a "recognized exception" (citations omitted) applies where enforcement of a challenged restriction
would adversely affect the rights of non-parties, and there is no effective
avenue for them to preserve their rights themselves.
Id. at D420-21. This exception applies to physicians in the present case because physicians'
own interests are at stake here. They are subject to discipline if they violate the notice
provisions of the Act.
9.
Id. at D420.
10.

Id.
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2001, the First District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed this decision and
found the statute constitutional."
This article discusses whether Florida's Parental Notice of Abortion
Act is constitutional under the Florida Constitution by analyzing the case of2
State v. North Florida Women's Health & Counseling Services, Inc.1
Section II of this article explores the circuit court's opinion, which found the
statute to be unconstitutional.13 Section II also discusses the case of In ret5
T. W., t4 since the circuit court held that case was controlling precedent.

Section II focuses on the appellants' arguments. Section IV addresses the
appellees' arguments. Section V examines the opinion of the First District
Court of Appeal of Florida, which found the statute constitutional and
reversed the circuit court's ruling.16 Section VI discusses why the first
district's holding should be reversed. Finally, Section VII concludes this
comment.
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT'S RULING
On May 12, 2000, the circuit court ordered a final judgment granting a
permanent injunction and concluded that the Parental Notice of Abortion Act
was unconstitutional.1 7 The circuit court based its conclusions of law on the
seminal case of In re T.W. 8 In In re T.W., the Supreme Court of Florida
ruled that a parental consent to abortion statute violated the Florida
Constitution's right to privacy.' 9 The circuit court applied the same legal
2
principles in the present case as were discussed in the case of In re T.W. 0
This section examines the legal principles applied in the case of In re T.W.
11. Id.
12. 26 Fla. L. Weekly D419 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001). This article only
addresses whether the Florida Parental Notice of Abortion Act is consistent with the Florida
constitutional right to privacy. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. However, plaintiffs in this case also
made claims that the Act is not consistent with the Florida Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause, that the Act violates minor females and physicians' due process rights, and that the
Act is in violation of the United States Constitution.
13. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 1, N. Fla. Women's Health &
Counseling Servs., Inc., No. 99-3202 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. App. May 12, 2000) [hereinafter Final
Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction].
14. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
15. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 8.
16. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D424.
17. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 1.
18. Id. at 8.
19. InreT.W.,551 So. 2d at 1196.
20. See generally Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 8-16.
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After reviewing In re T.W, the Appellants' Arguments section, summarizes
the reasons why appellants in the present case feel that the circuit court's
holding should be reversed.
In In re T.W., the Supreme Court of Florida first discussed how the
United States Supreme Court has, for the most part, left the issue of privacy
to the states, like protection of a man's property and his own life.
The
court stated that "[w]hile the federal Constitution traditionally shields
enumerated and implied individual liberties from encroachment by state or
federal government, the federal court has long held that state constitutions
may provide even greater protection., 22 The court then held that the Florida
citizens opted for a greater protection of the right to privacy when they
approved, by a general election in 1980, Article I, Section 23, of the Florida
Constitution:2 3 'Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free
from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's
right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law."
The
court further discussed how the drafters of the amendment rejected the
words "unreasonable" or "unwarranted" before the phrase "governmental
intrusion," making the right to privacy an even stronger right for the citizens
of Florida.2
After discussing the right to privacy in Florida, the court entertained the
issue of whether this right is implicated in a woman's decision to continue
her pregnancy.2 The court found that the right is in fact implicated and held
that "[t]he Florida Constitution embodies the principle that 'few decisions
are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to
individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision... whether to
end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is
fundamental."' 27
The next question the court addressed was whether this freedom of
choice concerning abortion extends to minors. 28 The court concluded that it
does, based on the language of the amendment: "[t]he right of privacy
21. Id. at 1191.
22. Id. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
23. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191. At the time this opinion was written, Florida was
one of the few states in this country having its own express constitutional provision
guaranteeing an independent right to privacy. Id. at 1190.
24. FLA. CONST. art. 1,§ 23.
25. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191.
26. Id. at 1192-93.
27. Id. at 1193.
28.

Id.
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extends to '[e]very natural person.' ' '29 The court held that minors are natural
people and, therefore, the amendment clearly applies to them. 30 Even though
the court held that the right extends to minors, a person's right to privacy is
not absolute. 31 A governmental intrusion into a person's private life is
lawful,3 2 only if the following standard is met:
[s]ince the privacy section as adopted contains no textual standard
of review, it is important for us to identify an explicit standard to
be applied in order to give proper force and effect to the amendment. The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe
demands the compelling state interest standard. This test shifts the
burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy. The
burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged regulation
serves a compelling state interest and
accomplishes its goal through
33
the use of the least intrusive means.
In applying this standard, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed every
state interest that is implicated in a minor's abortion decision to determine
whether any of these interests were compelling.34 The court found two
interests implicated in a minor's abortion decision, "the health of the mother
and the potentiality of life in the fetus. 35 To determine whether these
interests would be deemed compelling, the court used the same analysis that
was used by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. 36 Under Roe v. Wade,37 the
mother's health does not become a compelling state interest until immediately following the end of the first trimester and the potentiality of life in the
fetus first becomes a compelling state interest when the fetus becomes
viable. 3 8 The court in In re T.W. discussed how the parental consent to
abortion statute intrudes upon the privacy of the pregnant minor from
conception to birth. 39 The court thus concluded that the health of the mother
29.
30.

Id.
In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193.

31.
32.

Id.
Id.

33. Id. at 1192 (quoting Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544,
547 (Fla. 1985)). This standard applies to everyone, regardless of age. In Winfield, this

standard was applied to adults, and in In Re T.W., the standard was applied to a minor.
34.
35.

InreT.W.,551So. 2dat1193-95.
Id. at 1193.

36.

Id.

37.
38.
39.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 163.
In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989).
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and the potentiality of life in the fetus were not compelling state interests,
because the statute's "invasion of a pregnant female's privacy by the state
for the full term of the pregnancy is not' 4necessary for the preservation of
maternal health or the potentiality of life.
The T.W. court found that two more state interests were implicated in a
minor's abortion decision, "protection of the immature minor and preservation of the family unit.' 41 To determine whether these interests were compelling, the court examined section 743.065 of the Florida Statutes.42 The
court then noted that "under this statute, a minor may consent, without
parental approval, to any medical procedure involving her pregnancy or her
existing child-no matter how dire the possible consequences--except abortion. 43 The court concluded:
[i]n light of this wide authority that the state grants an unwed minor
to make life-or-death decisions concerning herself or an existing
child without parental consent, we are unable to discern a special
compelling interest on the part of the state under Florida law in
protecting the minor only where abortion is concerned. 44

40.

Id. at 1194.

41.

Id.

42. See id.at 1195. Section 743.065 of the FloridaStatutes provides:
Unwed pregnant minor or minor mother; consent to medical services for
minor or minor's child valid.(1) An unwed pregnant minor may consent to the performance of medical or
surgical care or services relating to her pregnancy by a hospital or clinic or by
a physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459, and such consent is
valid and binding as if she had achieved her majority.
(2) An unwed minor mother may consent to the performance of medical or
surgical care or services for her child by a hospital or clinic or by a physician
licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459, and such consent is valid and
binding as if she had achieved her majority.
(3) Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of s. 390.001 [the abortion
statute].
FLA.STAT. § 743.065 (2001).
43. Inre T.W.,551So. 2dat 1195.
44.

Id. In N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., the circuit court also

found that sections 384.30 and 394.4784 of the FloridaStatutes were inconsistent with the
Parental Notice of Abortion Act. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 11-12,
State v. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D419 (1st Dist.
Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001). These statutes provide that physicians, health care professionals, and
health facilities "may examine and provide treatment for sexually transmitted diseases to any
minor" without any parental involvement, and a minor age 13 or over may obtain mental
health diagnostic and evaluative services and outpatient crisis intervention services without
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Since the court found none of these interests compelling, the court held
the statute requiring parental consent to abortion unconstitutional. 45
I'.APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS

The appellants in North Florida Women's Health & Counseling
Services, Inc. first argued that the case of In re T.W. was not precedent, and
therefore, the circuit court had no right holding the case of In re T.W. as
controlling precedent. 46 The appellants argued that "under the Florida
Constitution, both a binding decision and a binding precedential opinion are
created to the extent that at least four members of the Court have joined in
an opinion and decision." 47 The appellants argued that In re T.W. was a
plurality opinion and "[t]he views of the justices in T.W. were divided into
five separate opinions, none of which garnered the four votes necessary
to
s
Constitution"4
Florida
the
under
'opinion'
constitute a precedential
The appellants next argued that even if In re T. W. is precedent, "[t]he
T. W. holding should be limited to the parental consent statute under consideration by the Court in that case., 49 In making this argument, the appellants cited to mainly federal law. 50 Appellants argued that the courts have
recognized a critical distinction between parental consent and parental notice
statutes.5 1 Appellants then quoted a United States Supreme Court opinion:
[T]he difference between notice and consent [requirements] was
apparent to us before and is apparent now. Unlike parental consent
laws, a law requiring parental notice does not give any third party
the legal right to make the minor's decision for her, or to prevent
her from obtaining an abortion should she choose to have one performed. We have acknowledged this distinction as "fundamental"

parental involvement. FLA. STAT. §§ 384.30, 394.4784 (2001).
45. InreT.W.,551So. 2datl196.
46. Appellants' Initial Brief at 22, State v. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling
Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D419 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (No. 1999-3279).
47. Id. (quoting Santos v.State, 629 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 1984)).
48. Id. (quoting Jones v.State, 640 So.2d 1084, 1091 (Fla.1994)).
49. Id.at23.
50. Id. at 23-25.
51. Appellant's Initial Brief at 23 (citing Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997);
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Akron II); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407 (1981)).
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and as one5 2 "substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional
challenge."
Appellants stated that, unlike a consent statute, "a parental notice statute has
neither 'the purpose nor effect 5of3 placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion."',
A third argument of appellants was that the circuit "failed to give
deference to the Legislature's findings and conclusions as to the 'compelling
state interest' for the Act.",54 They argued that legislative determinations of
public purpose and facts should not be ignored5 5and are presumed correct and
entitled to deference, unless clearly erroneous.
52. Appellants' Initial Brief at 23-24 (quoting Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 496).
53. Id. at 24 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)).
54. Id. at 20.
The legislature made the following specific findings:
1) "immature minors often lack the ability to make informed choices that take
into account both immediate and long-range consequences;" 2) the "unique
medical, emotional and psychological consequences of abortion are sometimes serious and can be lasting, particularly when the patient is immature;"
3) the "capacity to become pregnant and the capacity for mature judgment
concerning the wisdom of an abortion are not necessarily related;" 4) parents
ordinarily possess "information essential to a physician's exercise of his or
her best medical judgment concerning the child;" 5) parents who are "aware
that their minor daughter has had an abortion may better ensure that she
receives adequate medical attention after her abortion;" 6) "parental consultation is usually desirable and in the best interests of the minor;"
As to the compelling state interests in the Act, the statute provides as follows:
The Legislature's purpose in enacting parental notice legislation is to
further the important and compelling state interests of protecting minors
against their own immaturity, fostering family unity and preserving the family
as a viable social unit, protecting the constitutional rights of parents to rear
children who are members of the household.... reducing teenage pregnancy
and unnecessary abortion .... and ensur[ing] that parents are able to meet

their high duty to seek out and follow medical advice pertaining to their
children, stay apprised of the medical needs and physical condition of their
children, and recognize complications that might arise following medical
procedures or services, to preserve the right of parents to pursue a civil action
on behalf of their child before expiration of the statute of limitation if a
facility or physician commits medical malpractice that results in injury to a
child, and to prevent, detect, and prosecute batteries, rapes, and other crimes
committed upon minors.
Id. at 20-21.
55. Appellants' Initial Brief at 21 (citing State v. Division of Bond Fin., 495 So. 2d
183 (Fla. 1986); Miami Home Milk Producers Ass'n v. Milk Control Bd., 169 So. 541
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Finally, appellants argued that minors do not share the same degree of
privacy as adults and, therefore, the state may impose restrictions on minors'
privacy interests less intrusive than that of parental consent.5 6 They argued
that "the right to privacy of an unemancipated minor is more limited than
that of an adult. 5 7 Appellants asserted that the
Florida Legislature has in numerous areas prohibited or restricted a
minor's ability to make choices implicating privacy, including marriage without parental consent (§ 741.04(1), donating body parts (§
381.0041), consenting to sexual intercourse with an adult (§
800.04), receiving a permanent tatoo (§ 877.04), obtaining a
driver's license (§ 322.09), using a tanning facility (§ 381.89(7)),
entering into contracts (Chapter 743), or remaining in public places
during certain hours (§ 877.22).58
IV. APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS
Among the appellants' arguments against the circuit court's holding
was the claim that the circuit court should not have held the case of In re
T.W. as controlling precedent, since In re TW. was only a plurality
opinion. 59 In response, appellees argued that all the legal principles applied
by the circuit court in North Florida Women's Health & Counseling
Services, Inc. were espoused by a majority of the justices in In re T.W.
(1936)).
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id.

59. Id.
at 22.

60. Appellees' Answer Brief at 20-21, State v. N. Fla. Women's Health &
Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D419 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001). These legal
principles include:
1. Florida's State Constitution.... establishes a right of privacy that is

stronger and more broad in scope than the right to privacy found in the federal constitution. [See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190-92, 1197 (Fla.

1989)]
2. This right to privacy protects a woman's right to freely choose whether or
not to continue her pregnancy without interference from government or third
persons. [See id. at 1192-93,1197]
3. This right to choose to terminate extends to minors. [See id. at 1193,
1197]
4. It is a right so fundamental that the State may intrude upon it only if it can
demonstrate (a) a compelling state interest in doing so; and (b) seeks to
accomplish it through the least intrusive means. [See id. at 1192, 1197]
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Furthermore, appellees contended that the Supreme Court of Florida has
reteatedly recognized the precedential weight of the In re T.W. decision, and
correct in applying this decision as contherefore, the circuit
6 1 court was
trolling precedent.
Another argument of the appellants was that even if In re T.W. is
precedent, "[tihe T.W. holding should be limited to the parental consent
statute under consideration by the Court in that case.",62 Appellees responded
to this argument by claiming "that the parental notice law intrudes upon
law." 63
minors' right to choose abortion and is similar in effect to a consent
Appellees averred that:
Under both notice and consent laws, minors fear that telling their
parents about an impending abortion will result in abuse, being expelled from the home, disturbing an already dysfunctional or troubled family situation, or a parent exercising a de facto veto power
confining her to the
over the minor's decision by, for
64 example,
punishment.
threatening
or
house
A third argument of the appellants was that the circuit court failed to
give deference to the legislature's findings and conclusions as to the
"compelling state interest" for the Act. 65 In response to this argument,
appellees claimed that the legislative findings contained in the Act do not
satisfy the state's burden of demonstrating that the Act furthers a compelling
state interest. 66 Appellees asserted that declaring a certain objective a

5. Neither the health of the mother nor the potentiality of life in the fetus can
be a compelling state interest justifying an intrusion on the right to choose if

it applies to terminations of pregnancies within the first trimester. [See id. at
1193-94, 1197-98]
6. The State's interests in protecting an immature minor and fostering the
integrity of the family, while important and worthy, do not justify restricting a

minor's right to choose abortion where similar restrictions are not imposed on
comparable choices or decisions. [See id. at 1194-95, 1198-99]
Id.
61. Appellees' Answer Brief at 22 (citing B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla.
1995); Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086-87 (Fla. 1994); Post-Newsweek Stations v. Doe,
612 So. 2d 549, 552 (Fla 1992)).
62. Appellants' Initial Brief at 23.
63. Appellees' Answer Brief at 27.
64. Id. at 27-28.
65. Appellants' Initial Brief at 20.
66. Appellees' Answer Brief at 29-31.
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compelling state interest is not enough. 67 It must be demonstrated through
comprehensive and consistent legislative treatment. 68 Appellees then stated
that "[i]f the state could meet the compelling interest standard by inserting
the word 'compelling' into legislative findings, the protection of fundamental rights under Florida law would be eviscerated, because any statutory
restriction on privacy could satisfy this standard by legislative self-proclamation. 69
Finally, appellants argued that minors do not share the same degree of
privacy as adults, and therefore, the state may impose restrictions on minors'
privacy interests less intrusive than that of parental consent.70 In reply,
appellees contended that "whether minors have the same right to privacy as
adults, and whether the state may have compelling state interests that allow it
to intrude on minors' privacy rights although not on the rights of adults," are
two separate concepts. 7 1 Therefore, the fact that many laws prohibit or
restrict a minor's ability to make choices implicating privacy, does not mean
that a minor does not have a right to privacy. It simply means that each of
those statutes furthers a compelling state interest through the least intrusive
means.
V. THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL'S RULING
The court began its analysis by pointing out that the Florida constitutional right to privacy has been interpreted more broadly than any right to
privacy guaranteed under the federal Constitution. 72 The court then cited to
In re T.W. for the proposition that the "Right to Privacy is implicated when
the Legislature imposes restrictions on the ability, even of minors, to obtain
abortions." 73 The court also cited the plurality opinion of In re T. W. for the
proposition that while minors' rights to privacy include "freedom of choice
concerning abortion," they are not coextensive
with adults' rights to privacy
74
and "that a minor's rights are not absolute.,

67. Id. at 29.
68. Id.
69. Id.at 30.
70. Appellants' Initial Brief at 25-26.
71. Appellees' Answer Brief at 24.
72. State v. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly
D419, D421 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001).
73. Id. at D421.
74. Id. (citing In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193).
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The court then noted that since the Act requires that a minor's parent or
guardian be notified that [the minor] intends to undergo an abortion, the Act
plainly interferes with "the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into the person's private life."75 The court therefore concluded that
in order to withstand a constitutional challenge, the Act must serve 76a
compelling state interest and do so by the least intrusive means practicable.
The court then discussed whether the Act does in fact serve a compelling
interest. 77 The court noted that it does not have the authority to strike down
the Parental Notice of Abortion Act even if the state only establishes that
one interest is a compelling state interest and the Act furthers that interest by
the least intrusive means.7 The First District Court of Appeal then held that
the Act does establish at least one compelling state interest and accomplishes
this interest through the least intrusive means:
[b]y facilitating the ability of parents and guardians to fulfill their
duty to provide appropriate medical care for their daughters or
wards, the Act serves a compelling state interest. Parents are legally responsible for their minor children's health insofar as it is in
their power to foster it. They have a duty to stay alert to their minor
children's medical needs, and to secure appropriate medical assistance if they are able to do. See § 827.03(3)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (1999)
(defining neglect as including the failure to provide necessary
medicine and medical services); see also Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d
726, 730 (Fla. 1975) ("[A] parent has the obligation to nurture,
support, educate, and protect his minor children and the
79 child has
the right to call on him for the discharge of this duty.")
In coming to this conclusion, the First District Court of Appeal cited In
re T.W., and held that "[a]n important step in gauging whether an interest
should be deemed compelling is ascertaining whether the Legislature has
acted consistently in protecting the interest."80 The court then held that,
since it is necessary for a minor child to obtain consent before that child can
receive medical treatment (and therefore the parent must receive notice), the

75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
N. Fla. Women's Health & CounselingServ., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D421.

78.

Id. at D422.

79.

Id.
Id.

80.
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legislature has acted consistently in protecting the state's general interest in
facilitating adult assistance in managing medical problems.fl
It is the subject of the state's compelling interest that causes the
difference in opinion between the First District Court of Appeal and the
circuit court. The lower court noted that, according to the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act, notice is required to a parent or guardian of a minor before
that minor may obtain an abortion.8 z Yet, the circuit court also noted that
under Florida law, notice is not required to a parent or guardian of a minor
before that minor may obtain pregnancy treatment other than an abortion.8 3
Further, the circuit court held that, under Florida law, notice is not required
to a parent or guardian of a minor before that minor may obtain treatment for
sexually transmitted diseases. a The circuit court thus concluded that the
legislature's treatment of a minor's decision to choose an abortion is
inconsistent with its treatment of comparable decisions by a minor; hence, it
found the Parental Notice of Abortion Act unconstitutional.85 The First
District Court of Appeal rejected the contention that the laws regarding
pregnancy related treatment and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases
substantiate a legislative discounting of the importance of adult assistance in
managing minors' post-surgical care.86 The court stated that "[t]here are
obvious and important differences between sexually transmitted diseases,
pregnancies that go to term, and abortions and these differences logically
account for the differential statutory treatment. 87
The court noted that the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases is
rising at an alarming rate. 8 The court further stated that
rather than risk a (larger) epidemic, the Legislature has made a
clearly rational decision to minimize barriers to treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. Not requiring minors to notify their parents or guardians in order to obtain medical treatment for sexually
transmissible diseases evinces a public policy which in no way undermines or discredits the state's interest in trying to assure the
81. Id.
82. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 1, State v. N. Fla. Women's
Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2000) (No. 99-3202).
83.

N.Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly, at D422.

84.

Id.

85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.

88. State v. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly
D419, D422 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001).
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adequacy of minors'89care while they are recovering from surgery,
including abortions.

The First District Court of Appeal of Florida then gave its reason why it
felt that pregnancies that go to term were treated differently by the
The court reasoned that absent abortion,
legislature than abortions.
pregnancy-related treatment is by no means always surgery. 91 "Such surgery
as is necessary commonly occurs at the time of birth. By then most minors'
pregnancies are likely to be known to a parent or guardian so that a formal,
to give notice would not meaningfully advance any state
legal requirement
92
purpose."
VI. THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA SHOULD REVERSE THE HOLDING OF
THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

The first district agreed with the circuit court that: 1) the Florida
constitutional right to privacy is greater than the federal constitutional right
to privacy; 93 2) the right to privacy is implicated when the legislature
imposes restrictions on the ability to obtain abortions; 94 3) minors also enjoy
rights to privacy under the Florida Constitution; 95 4) in order to withstand a
constitutional challenge, the Act must serve a compelling state interest and
do so by the least intrusive means practicable; 9 6 and 5) an important step in
gauging whether an interest should be deemed compelling is ascertaining
whether the legislature has acied consistently in protecting the interest.97 The
first district only disagreed with the circuit court in that the circuit court
found that the Act does not serve a compelling state interest and the first
district found that it does.98 Therefore, the first district reversed the circuit
court's holding solely because the first district found that the Act serves a
compelling state interest. Consequently, the first district's holding should be
reversed if its reasoning that the Act serves a compelling state interest is
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
93. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D421.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D421.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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illogical. With that in mind, the following discussion attempts to show that
the court's reasoning here is, in fact, illogical.
In the first district's opinion, the court cited to the case of In re T.W. on
numerous occasions and clearly recognized the precedential weight of the In
re T.W. decision. However, the first district ruled completely against the
Supreme Court of Florida when it found that the Act serves a compelling
state interest. In In re T.W., the Supreme Court of Florida found that the
Parental Consent to Abortion Act was unconstitutional, because the
legislature had not acted consistently in protecting the immature minor and
the family unit.99 The Supreme Court of Florida found that, under Florida
law, a minor may consent, without parental approval, to any medical
procedure involving her pregnancy, except abortion.' ° The court then found
that:
In light of this wide authority that the state grants an unwed minor
to make life-or-death decisions concerning herself or an existing
child without parental consent, we are unable to discern a special
compelling interest on the part of the state under Florida law in
protecting the minor only where abortion is concerned.' 0'
In the present case, the first district held, in complete contrast to In re
T.W., that "[f]or parental notification purposes, the legislature also has a
legitimate basis for distinguishing between abortion and other pregnancyrelated medical treatments."102 The court reasoned that, absent abortion,
pregnancy-related treatment is by no means always surgery. 103 ,Such
surgery as is necessary commonly occurs at the time of birth. By then most
minors' pregnancies are likely to be known to a parent or guardian so that a

99. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1195 (Fla. 1989).
100. Id.
101. Id. In N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., the circuit court also

found that sections 384.30 and 394.4784 of the FloridaStatutes were inconsistent with the
Parental Notice of Abortion Act. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 11-12,
State v. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D419 (1st Dist.
Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001). These statutes provide that physicians, health care professionals, and
health facilities "may examine and provide treatment for sexually transmitted diseases to any
minor" without any parental involvement, and a minor aged thirteen or over may obtain
mental health diagnostic and evaluative services and outpatient crisis intervention services
without parental involvement. FLA. STAT. §§ 384.30, 394.4784 (2000).
102. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D422.

103. Id.
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formal, legal requirement to give notice would not meaningfully advance any
state purpose."'
The first district also held that the state has an interest in encouraging
transmitted diseases, but has no such
minors to seek treatment for sexually
05

interest in encouraging abortions.1

These alleged differences are no different now than when In re T.W.
was decided and the Supreme Court of Florida in In re T.W. obviously
considered them insignificant when the court held that the Florida
Legislature had °6acted inconsistently in protecting the immature minor and
the family unit.
For the foregoing reasons, the holding of the First District Court of
Appeal of Florida is inconsistent with the Supreme Court of Florida's holding in In re T.W. Furthermore, it is illogical, and therefore, should be
reversed.
VII. CONCLUSION

The issue of the constitutionality of the Parental Notice of Abortion Act
is far from over. There are many possibilities of what the future may hold.
One slight possibility is that the plaintiffs will choose not to do anything at
all and, in effect, surrender. If this happens, trial courts. throughout the state7
will have to obey the first district's holding that the Act is constitutional.1

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 12, N. Fla. Women's Health &
Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D419.
107. This will be the result, because the issue of whether the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act is constitutional has not been addressed by any other District Court of Appeal in
Florida. State v. Hayes was the first case in Florida to address this issue. This case held that
in absence of a contrary Fourth District Court of Appeal opinion a Palm Beach County circuit
court was bound to follow an opinion of the First District Court of Appeal.
In Florida the District Courts of Appeal are courts of final appellate jurisdiction except for a narrow classification of cases made reviewable by the Florida Supreme Court (citations omitted). The District Courts of Appeal are
required to follow Supreme Court decisions. As an adjunct to this rule it is
logical and necessary in order to preserve stability and predictability in the
law that, likewise, trial courts be required to follow the holdings of higher
courts District Courts of Appeal. The proper hierarchy of decisional holdings
would demand that in the event the only case on point on a district level is
from a district other than the one in which the trial court is located, the trial
court be required to follow that decision (citations omitted). Alternatively, if
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A more likely possibility is that plaintiffs will file a motion to stay the
issuance of the mandate from the First District Court of Appeal, pending
review by the Supreme Court of Florida.'0 8 If the first district grants a stay
pending review by the Supreme Court of Florida, then the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act will not become effective until the Supreme Court of Florida
has made a ruling on the case. However, the Supreme Court of Florida
might make a ruling not to make a ruling. In other words, they might deny
certiorari. This is unlikely, and the Supreme Court of Florida will most
likely hear this case, because it raises questions of great public importance
that are likely to recur.'0 9 It is hard to make a prediction on how the
Supreme Court of Florida will rule, but if it affirms the decision of the First
District Court of Appeal, this case is most likely over. Even if the United
States Supreme Court would decide to hear this case, it would most likely
hold the Parental Notice of Abortion Act constitutional. The reason for this
is that in Lambert v. Wickland,"0 the United States Supreme Court upheld a
Montana
notice statute that is very similar to the statute in the present
Ill
case.
No matter what happens in the future of this case, the issues raised will
forever be debated. This is because, in some cases, it is extremely beneficial
for a parent to receive notice before his or her daughter obtains an abortion,
while in other cases, it is very detrimental. This makes it very hard for us to
decide on the constitutionality of a law that requires notice for the whole
state of Florida. Fortunately, we do not need to make this decision. We
leave this to the courts, for judges have and will continue to struggle with
cases involving such difficult issues.

the district court of the district in which the trial court is located has decided
the issue, the trial court is bound to follow it.
State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
108. Id. at 54.
109. Id.
110. 520 U.S. 292 (1997).
111. Id. at299.
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